I aim to analyse the Enlightenment philosopher Kant’s concept of “cognition” (“Erkenntnis”). For Kant, “cognition” has a central programmatic role: Kant’s overall aim is to delineate the extent to which we humans can “cognise” the world. Until recently, it was widely assumed that “cognition” is simply a form of “knowledge.” Yet, recent research shows that Kant’s notion of “cognition” does not quite fit any available account of “knowledge.” Hence, to understand Kant’s so-called “transcendental idealism,” a new interpretation of his concept of “cognition” is needed. I intend to fill this gap. The results will be valuable not only for historians of philosophy but also for society at large. Through analysing fundamental epistemic notions, we can better understand our epistemic practices and their value. For instance, the prevalence of “fake news” in social media demonstrates the need for a deep understanding of the respective values of truth, authenticity, and reliability. Before taking up this project, I read Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at King’s College London and later completed the MPhil in Philosophy at Cambridge. I am deeply honoured and humbled to be a part of the Gates Cambridge community.